Top of the Heap: Efficient Memory Error Protection for Many Heap Objects

Exploits against heap memory errors continue to be a major concern. Although many defenses have been proposed, heap data are not protected from attacks that exploit memory errors systematically. Research defenses focus on complete coverage of heap objects, often giving up on comprehensive memory safety protection and/or incurring high costs in performance overhead and memory usage. In this paper, we propose a solution for heap memory safety enforcement that aims to provide comprehensive protection from memory errors efficiently by protecting those heap objects whose accesses are provably safe from memory errors. Specifically, we present the Uriah system that statically validates spatial and type memory safety for heap objects, isolating compliant objects on a safe heap that enforces temporal type safety to prevent attacks on memory reuse. Using Uriah, 71.9% of heap allocation sites can be shown to produce objects (73% of allocations are found safe) that satisfy spatial and type safety, which are then isolated using Uriah's heap allocator from memory accesses via unsafe heap objects. Uriah only incurs 2.9% overhead and only uses 9.3% more memory on SPEC CPU2006 (C/C++) benchmarks, showing that many heap objects can be protected from all classes of memory errors efficiently

AdLER: Adversarial Training with Label Error Rectification for One-Shot Medical Image Segmentation

Accurate automatic segmentation of medical images typically requires large datasets with high-quality annotations, making it less applicable in clinical settings due to limited training data. One-shot segmentation based on learned transformations (OSSLT) has shown promise when labeled data is extremely limited, typically including unsupervised deformable registration, data augmentation with learned registration, and segmentation learned from augmented data. However, current one-shot segmentation methods are challenged by limited data diversity during augmentation, and potential label errors caused by imperfect registration. To address these issues, we propose a novel one-shot medical image segmentation method with adversarial training and label error rectification (AdLER), with the aim of improving the diversity of generated data and correcting label errors to enhance segmentation performance. Specifically, we implement a novel dual consistency constraint to ensure anatomy-aligned registration that lessens registration errors. Furthermore, we develop an adversarial training strategy to augment the atlas image, which ensures both generation diversity and segmentation robustness. We also propose to rectify potential label errors in the augmented atlas images by estimating segmentation uncertainty, which can compensate for the imperfect nature of deformable registration and improve segmentation authenticity. Experiments on the CANDI and ABIDE datasets demonstrate that the proposed AdLER outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods by 0.7% (CANDI), 3.6% (ABIDE "seen"), and 4.9% (ABIDE "unseen") in segmentation based on Dice scores, respectively. The source code will be available at https://github.com/hsiangyuzhao/AdLER

You Do (Not) Belong Here: Detecting DPI Evasion Attacks with Context Learning

As Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) middleboxes become increasingly popular, a spectrum of adversarial attacks have emerged with the goal of evading such middleboxes. Many of these attacks exploit discrepancies between the middlebox network protocol implementations, and the more rigorous/complete versions implemented at end hosts. These evasion attacks largely involve subtle manipulations of packets to cause different behaviours at DPI and end hosts, to cloak malicious network traffic that is otherwise detectable. With recent automated discovery, it has become prohibitively challenging to manually curate rules for detecting these manipulations. In this work, we propose CLAP, the first fully-automated, unsupervised ML solution to accurately detect and localize DPI evasion attacks. By learning what we call the packet context, which essentially captures inter-relationships across both (1) different packets in a connection; and (2) different header fields within each packet, from benign traffic traces only, CLAP can detect and pinpoint packets that violate the benign packet contexts (which are the ones that are specially crafted for evasion purposes). Our evaluations with 73 state-of-the-art DPI evasion attacks show that CLAP achieves an Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC-ROC) of 0.963, an Equal Error Rate (EER) of only 0.061 in detection, and an accuracy of 94.6% in localization. These results suggest that CLAP can be a promising tool for thwarting DPI evasion attacks.Comment: 12 pages, 12 figures; accepted to ACM CoNEXT 202

Uni-COAL: A Unified Framework for Cross-Modality Synthesis and Super-Resolution of MR Images

Cross-modality synthesis (CMS), super-resolution (SR), and their combination (CMSR) have been extensively studied for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Their primary goals are to enhance the imaging quality by synthesizing the desired modality and reducing the slice thickness. Despite the promising synthetic results, these techniques are often tailored to specific tasks, thereby limiting their adaptability to complex clinical scenarios. Therefore, it is crucial to build a unified network that can handle various image synthesis tasks with arbitrary requirements of modality and resolution settings, so that the resources for training and deploying the models can be greatly reduced. However, none of the previous works is capable of performing CMS, SR, and CMSR using a unified network. Moreover, these MRI reconstruction methods often treat alias frequencies improperly, resulting in suboptimal detail restoration. In this paper, we propose a Unified Co-Modulated Alias-free framework (Uni-COAL) to accomplish the aforementioned tasks with a single network. The co-modulation design of the image-conditioned and stochastic attribute representations ensures the consistency between CMS and SR, while simultaneously accommodating arbitrary combinations of input/output modalities and thickness. The generator of Uni-COAL is also designed to be alias-free based on the Shannon-Nyquist signal processing framework, ensuring effective suppression of alias frequencies. Additionally, we leverage the semantic prior of Segment Anything Model (SAM) to guide Uni-COAL, ensuring a more authentic preservation of anatomical structures during synthesis. Experiments on three datasets demonstrate that Uni-COAL outperforms the alternatives in CMS, SR, and CMSR tasks for MR images, which highlights its generalizability to wide-range applications

Off-Path TCP Exploits of the Mixed IPID Assignment

In this paper, we uncover a new off-path TCP hijacking attack that can be used to terminate victim TCP connections or inject forged data into victim TCP connections by manipulating the new mixed IPID assignment method, which is widely used in Linux kernel version 4.18 and beyond to help defend against TCP hijacking attacks. The attack has three steps. First, an off-path attacker can downgrade the IPID assignment for TCP packets from the more secure per-socket-based policy to the less secure hash-based policy, building a shared IPID counter that forms a side channel on the victim. Second, the attacker detects the presence of TCP connections by observing the shared IPID counter on the victim. Third, the attacker infers the sequence number and the acknowledgment number of the detected connection by observing the side channel of the shared IPID counter. Consequently, the attacker can completely hijack the connection, i.e., resetting the connection or poisoning the data stream. We evaluate the impacts of this off-path TCP attack in the real world. Our case studies of SSH DoS, manipulating web traffic, and poisoning BGP routing tables show its threat on a wide range of applications. Our experimental results show that our off-path TCP attack can be constructed within 215 seconds and the success rate is over 88%. Finally, we analyze the root cause of the exploit and develop a new IPID assignment method to defeat this attack. We prototype our defense in Linux 4.18 and confirm its effectiveness through extensive evaluation over real applications on the Internet